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In Respondent's statement (page 4) it contends that
Appellant did not in the original pleading nor in the two
amended pleadings of each of the three cases pray for the
foreclosure of its whole lien by a sale of all the property
covered by its lien, and to which it claimed to have furnished
materials, and the "bond law" wasn't mentioned. We do not
agree with this statement. In paragraph 3 of its prayer in
the Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Appellant
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prays for judgment that the lien of Appellant be decreed
superior to that of Respondent and for a sale of the property,
and in paragraph 4 of the prayer Appellant prays for judgment against Mecham, and against plaintiff and Cross-defendants for any deficiency. In paragraph 4 of the Third Defense
in each case Appellant alleges that plaintiff had not required
a bond from defendant, Robert B. Mecham, as required by
Title 14-2-2, UCA 1953, and again in paragraph 6 of the
Third Defense Appellant alleges that upon Cross-Defendant
D. Spencer Grow learning of his and plaintiffs together with
the other Cross-Defendants liability created by Section 14-2-2,
UCA 1953, Cross-defendant, D. Spencer Grow, changed his
proposal, and proposed to Robert B. Mecham that Mecham
secure a tract of land for construction of proposed subdivisions, etc. Of course Appellant could not ask the court
in these actions to order a sale of that property which was
not brought before the court by the foreclosure actions of
Respondent when Appellant was brought into the action as a
defendant by Respondent.
It is surprising that Respondent represents that Appellant did not bring before the court cross-defendant D. Spencer Grow and the other cross-defendants named in the title of
Appellant's answer and cross-complaint. All of the cross
defendants named filed their pleading to the cross-complaint
in the form of a reply and at no time during the trial of the
case did Respondent contend that these parties were not
before the court.
Respondent sets out at pages 5 and 6 of its brief certain findings of the court (a) and (b) referring to Keyridge properties and (d) referring to a parcel of land in
Provo, Utah. None of these properties were in issue in any
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the three actions, it having been pointed out by Appellant
its original brief that Appellant seeks to foreclose its lien
to the Keyridge properties covered by Appellant's liert
another action now pending in the district court.

At page 7 of Respondent's brief Respondent contends
that because Appellant is not seeking to foreclose its lien as
against all the property described in the Notice of Lien but
because Appellant is claiming the total amount of its lien
a~ against the 34 properties its lien is invalid. Appellant
devoted much of its original brief pointing out the fact that
while the lien as filed is in the total amount against each
property liened still Appellant must rely on the apportionable rule in the foreclosure of its lien and the sale of the
property. Respondent throughout the trial of the case and in
its brief, and even now appears to be confused in the matter
of the filing of a lien and proceedings for the foreclosure of
the lien and sale of the property.
Again at page 15 Respondent reiterates the fact that because, as Respondent contends, Appellant is not seeking the
foreclosure of its lien against 101 properties covered by its
lien, the lien is unenforceable. It seems that Respondent
assumes that a lien cannot be foreclosed in more than one
action. Appellant is seeking and will seek the enforcement
of its lien as it affects other properties not involved in these
actions and not affected by those mortgages herein sued on
by Respondent in another action now pending and in other
actions to be filed when the building has been completed.
Appellant takes no issue with those authorities cited by
Respondent which hold that a single mechanic's lien may not
be enforced against less than the whole of the property
liened, that does not mean that the lien may not be enforced
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in more than one action aand especially is this true where
as in this case a foreclosure of mortgages is filed against a
part of the property covered by the lien which requires the
lien claimant to defend as against such foreclosure. Appellant is not seeking foreclosure of the whole its lien against
only a portion of the property liened.
In Rockel on Mechanic's Lien, Sec. 237 page 572 it is
said:
""If all of the tract of land that is subject to a lien
is not described in the complaint and the building
itself covered all, a decree for the entire tract may
be had. As a general rule however, only the part of
the land described in the petition can be held and
decreed subject to the lien."
In the Sarginson vs. Turner case, 124 P. 379 quoted
from by Respondent at page 17, it appears the case was
decided against the lien claimant because the controlling
issue was whether the lien claimant contracted with the
agent for the owner or not and the court found that the
claimant did not contract with the agent for the owner.
There is no contention in the instant case by Respondent that
Mecham was not the agent for the owner of some Schauerharner properties or that Mecham was the owner-builder of
some of the Schauerhamer properties and of the Rowley and
LaMesa properties.
Reference is also made by Respondent to the Brannan
vs. Santa Fe Land Co. case found in 332 P (2d) 892 relied
on by Appellant and it is argued by Respondent that the
court attributed the lien to a portion of the property because it was easily ascertained. It is to be noted however
that the court and not the lien claimant apportioned the lien

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
and this even though the lien claimant had filed his lien for
the total amount of its claim against a portion of the property
on which work and materials were furnished.
Under Respondent's Point II Respondent again misconstrues the contentions of Appellant in its pointing out that
Appellant by the three cases now before the court seeks
the foreclosure of it's lien on but 34 properties, however as
heretofore stated while this is true because of the manner
in which Appellant was brought into the foreclosure actions
as a defendant, still appellant looks to the other properties
on which its materials were furnished and on which it filed
its lien for satisfaction of its lien as it affects those properties
through other actions. This is the reason Appellant seeks to
have the apportionment rule applied by the court.
At pages 20 and 21 of Respondent's brief Respondent
sets out some of the findings of the trial court by which the
court found that Mecham paid a cash consideration to Rowley
for the four Rowley lots and that Mecham paid $20,000 of
a $30,000 consideration to Rowleys for the purchase of the
LaMesa properties. The court should have found that these
monies were furnished by Respondent and that Mecham had
no monies with which to purchase either of said properties.
The other findings set forth on pages 22 and 23 show
that Mecham treated his venture as one project, working in
all four areas at one and the same time, and therefore Appellant's lien was prior in time to the mortgages on Schauerharner, Rowley and LaMesa areas because of the furnishing
of materials on the Keyridge area much earlier than the
mortgages were filed on the three mentioned areas. Should
the Honorable Court not agree with this position of Appellant then most certainly the priority of Appellant's lien is
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established as of the first delivery to Schauerhamer which
would give priority over the Rowley and LaMesa mortgages.
Even if Appellant conceded for the purpose of argument
that Mecham was the owner of all the properties as Respondent contends, and neither Grow, or Grow's companies
or Respondent were the owners of the properties affected by
the three actions and of the properties mortgaged by Mecham
and foreclosed on by Respondent which properties are located.
in the Schauerhamer, Rowley, and LaMesa areas, then we
have an Owner-Contractor relationship with the Lien Claimants who would be original contractors and not sub-contractors as was held by this Honorable Court in the case of
Holbrook vs. Webster's Inc., et al. 320 P2d 661 Mecham
having admitted that he had but one contract with Appellant
and one account, then the lien attached as contended for by
Appellant. It is unimportant that the properties W'ere not
contiguous.
In Rockell on Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 135, p. 359 the
Virginia Code is quoted and considered as follows:
"Under Virginia Code, 1873, c 115, Sec. 3,
which provides that 'persons performing labor or
furnishing materials for the construction, repair or
improverp.ent of any building or other property shall
have a lien upon such property', a subcontractor who
furnishes materials for the construction of two houses
erected under a single contract on lots on opposite
sides of a street has a joint lien on both houses and
lots for the entire amount of materials furnished for
both houses."
The Virginia Code is similar to Sec. 38-1-3, UCA 1953.
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It is evident from the law as stated by Rockell that the
property liened need not be contiguous and if it can be
separated by a street then under the same rule of law it can
be one block, one mile or two miles apart so long as it is
treated as one project by the contractor in dealing with the
materialman. The test is, was the building under one contract. Mecham admits that it was.
Rockell further says at page 361:
"The fact that at one time the land upon which
the building is erected was in two tracts will not prevent it from being considered as one, so far as the
lien is concerned if treated as such by the owner."
As to the court's having found that Mecham was engaged
in other building for others, this is unimportant especially as
to the rights of this Appellant for the reason that it does not
appear from the evidence that any of the materials furnished
by Appellant went into other properties than those liened.
Referring to Point III raised by Respondent, as heretofore pointed out, the bond law was an issue in the case at all
times and never was abandoned by Appellant. The apportionment rule may be applied under this rule the same as
under the foreclosure of the lien. There is an abundance of
evidence, other than that pointed out by Appellant in it's
brief, showing that all the materials furnished by Appellant
and used on the four areas were delivered to either the Keyridge or LaMesa points of delivery and taken from those
two points by Mecham's men and used in each house in each
area as needed.
Under Respondent's Point IV it states that there is no
evidence in the record showing that Mecham was instructed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
by Grow as agent of Respondent to take title in his
(Mecham's) name and that Respondent would furnish the
money, and that Respondent was the real party in interest.
While those exact words may not have been used by the witnesses the meaning was most certainly there as is evident
from the following portion of the record taken from Mr.
Bullock's cross examination of Mr. Mecham, page 397. The
following is the answer given by Mr. Mecham to a question
propounded by Mr. Bullock:
A

The time we started the last seven houses in
Schauerhamer, we had discovered that we were
getting ourselves out on a limb, ready to be
sawed off. And it was necessary to obtain new
building, new work, and new money as fast as
we could to pay the bills on Keyridge, and also
the other houses being built for Mr. Grow on contract in the Schauerhamer division. Therefore
we kept-we cut our crew down on Keyridge,
also on the other two houses designated as lots
10 and 11, in the Schauerhamer division, thereby making it possible to build faster on the new
construction, to pull more money back in to pay
old bills on Keyridge, and bills that were accumulating on the houses we had contracts for.

(page 403)

Q

What I want to know is what did you tell Mr.
Grow with reference to the deal which you had
with the Rowleys with respect to these four lots?

A

In general I told him I had gone ahead with the
plan of obtaining ground and we were held up
for the tin1e being by Orem City, so we could
get permits on LaMesa. This ground was obtainable and it would keep the crew busy while
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the other ground was being prepared for permits.

Q

Did you tell Mr. Grow that you needed the
money to pay for the land?

A

I imagine I did.

Q

Do you remember whether you did or not?

A

I don't remember in that many words.
initely knew I needed it.

Q

Why did he know that you needed the money?

A

He knew that that was the reason I was going on
to new ground, was to build more houses and
acquire-get a hold of more money so I could
pay the bills.

Q

Is it your testimony that the transfer of title to
the Rowley property took place after the transfer of title to the LaMesa?

A

No, that is not my testimony. My testimony is
that the original deal between myself and the
Rowleys, with Mr. Grow's consent, was made for
LaMesa prior to the deal for the Rowley lots.

Q

What arrangements did you have for payment
on the LaMesa ground?

A

I had previously arranged, with the consent of

He def-

Mr. Grow, to have the property deeded to me,
and in turn, give the Rowleys a second mortgage
on the property. Then payment was to come to
Rowleys from money drawn on those particular
lots.

Q

From Utah Savings?

A

Yes.
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Respondent states under Point V that Appellant refused
to consider apportioning its lien at the pre-trial and at the
trial of the case. Such is not the case. Upon inquiry being
made of counsel for Appellant, at both the pre-trial and at the
trial, if Appellant was claiming the whole of its lien against
all of the property and each of the tracts and counsel stated
that it was, which is correct. Counsel stated that it would
not be possible to show the amount of material charged to
each property, but at no time did Appellant represent that it
would not rely on the equitable equal apportionable rule.
The 52 lot figure was determined from the evidence, the
fact that Appellant's materials went into 52 of the properties improved, all of which are covered by Appellant's
lien, the descriptions of which were taken from information
furnished to Appellant by Respondent in the Lien Waiver
requested by Respondent from Appellant.
At page 30 of Respondent's brief Respondent states that
there is no evidence as to the value of materials furnished
by Appellant "to be used" in or upon or actually used in or
upon any one or group of the 34 properties involved in the
three actions and that there is no evidence that Appellant
furnished any materials "to be used" in the Schauerhamer
or Rowley areas. Mr. Mecham testified to the fact that
materials furnished under his order by Appellant were used
in each of the areas and upon each one of the properties and
that testimony is undisputed and uncontradicted even by Mr.
Grow. It is evident that the same plans were used in each
area with a few exterior changes or by the placing of the
building either long wise or side wise on the lot, and while
the Schauerhamer, Rowley, and LaMesa houses contained
a little tnore square foot area, still the houses were sub-
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stantially the same.
dence.

There is no contradiction of this evi-

As to Point VI Respondent states that Appellant's witness Knudsen admitted he knew of the existence of mortgages
on the properties. The evidence is substantially to the effect
that from his experience in the business he had knowledge
of the fact that building projects were financed through mortgage money. He had no actual knowledge of the particular
mortgages as against a particular property. The fact is that
in the LaMesa area the mortgages do not describe the property on which the improvement was made.
On page 33 Respondent states that Mrs. Mecham called
the Notary Public who took Mrs. Mecham's acknowledgment
over the telephone. We submit that this is not the evidence.
The evidence is to the effect that Mrs. Mecham talked with
an employee who testified that she was in the office with the
Notary and the employee advised the Notary that Mrs.
Mecham had acknowledged the signing of the instrument to
her.
Respondent relies on the Utah case of N orthcrest Inc. vs.
Walker Bank & Trust Co. 248 P2d 692 in support of its argument that Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of
the regularity of the acknowledgment on the mortgages affecting the LaMesa properties. It is Appellant's contention
that this presumption was overthrown and that it was the
duty of Respondent to then prove which mortgages it contended were valid.
As to Point VII regarding the question of estoppel, it is
the contention of Appellant and Appellant urges that Respondent should be estopped from questioning the validity of Appellant's lien because of its actions and the part taken by
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Respondent in dealing with lien claimants through Robert
1\tlecham. Mecham has not questioned the lien and in all
fairness, and equity dictates that Respondent should be
estopped from questioning the validity of this lien. Mr.
Grow, as agent for Respondent, knew that Mecham was broke
and that Mecham could not even finish the houses started for
Grow and his companies in the Keyridge area and still Respondent was willing to finance Mecham in these other areas
having full knowledge of the fact that Mecham was in debt
some $150,000. Respondent had full knowledge of the fact
that monies were being taken from the LeMesa mortgages
before, as Respondent contends, one stick of lumber had been
used in LaMesa and before any work had been done in this
area, and used to pay old bills on Keyridge and to acquire
land in the LaMesa and Rowley areas. Respondent made it
possible for Mecham to continue to pile up obligations with
materialmen who were furnishing materials for the properties. If Mecham had drawn on the Keyridge area, monies
in excess of the contract price as Respondent contends on
pages 38 and 39 of it's brief, it was the obligation of Respondent to put a stop to such action on the part of Mecham
and to not encourage the continuance of such actions to the
detriment of others, as it does appear it was to the detriment
of those dealing with Mecham. Respondent controlled the
payment of monies realized from the mortgages at all
times. Mecham did not even know which accounts the
draws were being charged against.
Respondent states at page 40 of it's brief that in twenty
days of trial and in over thirty depositions not a single lien
claimant, including any witness for Appellant, could or did
point to any representation made by Respondent, Cross-
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defendants, or any of them, whereby any lien claimant was
misled into extending credit to Mecham, or respecting the
ownership of any of the properties. We submit that the
record is filled with statements and particularly acts and
conduct on the part of Respondent which misled lien claimants and which induced them to continue to furnish their
materials to the properties and to extend credit to Mecham.
Respondent argues that because of the incompetence and
mis-management of Mecham all parties including Respondent have suffered a great loss. In this Appellant agrees, but
Respondent was in a position to have put a stop to such
action at any time, which it failed and refused to do.
Under Respondent's Point VIII it would have the court
treat the transaction between Mecham and Appellant as though
Mecham had operated a plumbing business from the two
points of warehousing of materials, but the evidence will not
bear out such contention. The evidence is uncontradicted to
the effect that all the materials charged for by Appellant and
for whirJ1 it's lien was filed were received and used by
Mecham upon the properties liened. From the authorities
cited by Respondent under its Point VIII, Respondent would
have this Honorable Court reverse the decision handed down
by this Honorable Court in the Sierra Nevada Lbr. Co. vs ..
Whitmore case. As an example of those cases on which Respondent relies, in the Tabet vs. Davenport case cited at page
44 it appears from the facts in that case that a large portion
of the materials delivered were delivered to a plumbing company warehouse which was not even on the property liened.,
and even placed in bins with like materials. Therefore this
Honorable Court should not be pursuaded by such decisions.
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The judgment of the trial court should therefore be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
M. V. BACKMAN, of
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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